

Supplementary Information for “International Status Concerns and Domestic Support for Political Leaders”

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A Scenario-Based Experiments

B SSI Sample

Our study was embedded in a larger survey of the public fielded on a sample of approximately 2,700 Americans in the Spring of 2016. The sample was recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI) who placed quotas on gender, age, census region, and income to ensure that we had access to a diverse sample of the American public. The demographic breakdown of the resulting sample is presented in Table A2. While the sample is not a probability-based representative sample, a number of researchers have shown that online convenience samples, including those recruited by SSI, respond to experimental manipulations in ways that are similar to probability based samples (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Coppock and McClellan 2019).

B.1 Protocol

We randomly assigned respondents to one of the four scenarios. Additionally, we randomly assigned respondents to view either the success or failure outcome. The exact wordings of each of these scenarios and the success/failure conditions are presented in Table B.1.

After viewing information about the scenario, all respondents are asked the following questions:

- How do you think the president’s actions in this situation would affect the status or prestige of the United States in the eyes of foreign political leaders around the world? Response options: Increase a lot, Increase a moderate amount, Increase a little bit, Neither increase nor decrease, Decrease a little bit, Decrease a moderate amount, Decrease a lot.
- How do you think the president’s actions in this situation would affect the military and economic power of the United States in the eyes of foreign political leaders around the world? Response options: Increase a lot, Increase a moderate amount, Increase a little bit, Neither increase nor decrease, Decrease a little bit, Decrease a moderate amount, Decrease a lot.
- Do you think the current President is more or less competent than other recent presidents? Response options: Much more competent, Moderately more competent, A little bit more competent, Neither more or less competent, A little bit less competent, Moderately less competent, Much less competent.
- Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove, of the president’s handling this situation? Response options: Approve very strongly, Approve moderately strongly, Approve slightly, Neither approve nor disapprove, Disapprove slightly, Disapprove moderately strongly, Disapprove very strongly.
- As a result of the president’s handling of this foreign policy crisis, do you think the U.S. is more or less likely to be challenged by its adversaries? Response options: Much more likely, Moderately more likely, A little bit more likely, Neither more or less likely, A little bit less likely, Moderately less likely, Much less likely.

Table A1: Exact wording of each scenario introductions and treatment conditions.

Scenario	Introduction	Good outcome	Bad outcome
Repel the Attacker	Let me tell you about a country that has just attacked another country. The attack came out of the blue. The attacking country is militarily strong, and it would take a major effort to push them back. The country that has been attacked is important to U.S. economic and security interests. To summarize: there was an unprovoked attack, the attacker is militarily strong, and U.S. interests are at stake.	The President tried hard to find diplomatic solution to the crisis and was successful. He was able to convince the attacking country to agree to a ceasefire and withdraw its forces. In explaining his willingness to negotiate, the leader of the attacking country cited his belief that the U.S. would be willing to commit enough military forces in order to help the country that was attacked repel the invading military forces.	The President tried hard to find diplomatic solution to the crisis, but failed. He was unable to convince the attacking country to agree to a ceasefire and withdraw its forces. In explaining his refusal to negotiate, the leader of the attacking country cited his belief that the U.S. would not be willing to commit enough military forces in order to help the country that was attacked repel the invading military forces.
New Chinese IO	The United States has been a military and economic leader in the post-World War II international community. The U.S. helped create and plays a dominant role in a number of international organizations that monitor the health and development of the international economy. China recently founded a new international organization to compete with western-led international organizations. The U.S. president views the new organization as a challenge to the U.S.-led international economic order. Hoping to limit the new organization's influence, the president repeatedly pressed close allies like the U.K. and other Western European countries to refuse any role in the new organization.	The president's efforts were successful. The U.S.'s closest European ally, the United Kingdom, was convinced by the president's efforts and refused to join the Chinese-led organization. Other Western European countries also refused membership. Observers characterized the President's efforts as a foreign policy success. One said, If the president had handled the situation differently, the new Chinese-led organization would be more of a threat to U.S. influence around the world.	The president's efforts were wasted. The U.S.'s closest European ally, the United Kingdom, rebuffed the president's efforts by joining the Chinese-led organization last spring. Other Western European countries also accepted membership. Observers characterized the President's efforts as a foreign policy failure. One said, If the president had handled the situation differently, the new Chinese-led organization would be less of a threat to U.S. influence around the world.
Embassy Closure	The United States has had a long-simmering, but not public, disagreement with another county. The county is an important ally and trading partner. The ally wanted the U.S. to stop providing economic and military support to one of its neighbors because of routine human rights abuses that occur in that country.	Citing national security concerns, the President refused to do so. However, the president agreed to quietly pressure the ally's neighbor to improve its human rights record. The ally privately praised the President's decision. Observers suggested that if the President had acted differently, it could have developed into a public split between the U.S. and its ally. In fact, the ally might have recalled its ambassador to the U.S. and temporarily closed its embassy in Washington, D.C.	Citing national security concerns, the President refused to do so. Further, he refused even to quietly pressure the ally's neighbor to improve its human rights record. The ally publicly protested the President's decision. Observers suggested that if the President had acted differently, the public split between the U.S. and its ally could have been avoided. Instead, the ally ultimately recalled its ambassador to the U.S. and temporarily closed its embassy in Washington, D.C.
Use of Torture	In conflicts ranging from World War I to the present, the United States has often captured combatants from the opposing side. These combatants may have information of interest for the conflict, such as plans for future attacks. Some U.S. officials believe interrogating these combatants through a variety of harsh and unconventional methods is a useful way to obtain information. The interrogation methods, if used, would involve torture, meaning that they would cause severe pain or suffering. The United States has signed international treaties that do not allow the use of these methods under any circumstances. Thus, if they were used, these interrogation methods would violate international law.	Consistent with international law, the President refused to authorize the use of these interrogation methods and this refusal became known to leaders of other Western democracies.	In violation of international law, the President authorized the use of these interrogation methods and this authorization became known to leaders of other Western democracies.

B.2 Demographics

Variable	Levels	n	%
Education	Up to some high school	92	3.5
	High School graduate or equivalent (GED)	525	19.8
	Some college, but did not complete a degree	619	23.4
	Associate degree	314	11.9
	Bachelor's degree (BA/BS)	654	24.7
	Advanced degree	443	16.7
	all	2647	100.0
Gender	Female	1410	51.4
	Male	1336	48.6
	all	2746	100.0
Income	Up to 29,999	810	29.5
	30,000-59,999	747	27.2
	60,000-99,999	593	21.6
	100,000-149,999	405	14.8
	More than 150,000	189	6.9
	all	2744	100.0
Age	18-29	673	26.0
	30-39	554	21.4
	40-49	421	16.2
	50-59	420	16.2
	60-69	364	14.0
	70+	160	6.2
	all	2592	100.0
Region	Northeast	489	17.9
	Midwest	598	21.9
	South and Central	1006	36.8
	West	638	23.4
	all	2731	100.0

Table A2: Distribution of demographic variables (SSI)

B.3 Results with dichotomous coding of dependent variable

Table A3: Effect of treatment on expectations of decreased status (H1). Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Expectations of Decreased Status (dichotomous)									
	All Experiments		New Chinese IO		Torture		Repel Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Adverse outcome treatment	19.07*** (1.75)	19.59*** (1.77)	26.25*** (3.47)	26.82*** (3.52)	17.04*** (3.63)	16.97*** (3.60)	17.54*** (3.29)	17.21*** (3.33)	16.00*** (3.59)	16.38*** (3.69)
High School		0.06 (5.17)		3.89 (9.41)		−15.59 (12.25)		−1.00 (9.07)		7.49 (11.19)
Some college		4.45 (5.12)		6.18 (9.28)		−1.70 (12.13)		−0.60 (9.08)		7.47 (11.07)
Associate degree		0.45 (5.45)		9.22 (10.02)		−5.89 (12.63)		−17.30* (9.73)		7.98 (11.84)
Bachelor’s degree		4.07 (5.22)		10.82 (9.59)		−2.92 (12.30)		−8.55 (9.27)		10.72 (11.16)
Advanced degree		2.83 (5.47)		15.45 (10.11)		−7.74 (12.81)		−4.52 (9.57)		1.00 (11.87)
Income		−0.71 (0.81)		−1.23 (1.60)		0.11 (1.63)		−0.41 (1.49)		−0.82 (1.74)
Female		−3.35* (1.78)		−5.89* (3.54)		−2.26 (3.61)		−3.39 (3.32)		−0.84 (3.75)
Age		0.22*** (0.05)		0.19* (0.11)		0.57*** (0.11)		0.07 (0.10)		0.02 (0.11)
Ideology		3.32*** (0.52)		2.63** (1.06)		2.43** (1.04)		4.46*** (0.97)		3.98*** (1.09)
Constant	22.76*** (1.23)	0.84 (5.67)	22.66*** (2.34)	1.53 (10.28)	26.90*** (2.55)	−1.17 (12.78)	16.86*** (2.33)	3.73 (10.42)	24.69*** (2.59)	3.24 (12.47)
Observations	2,725	2,633	703	679	672	653	681	655	669	646
R ²	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.08	0.03	0.05

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A4: Effect of treatment on presidential approval (H2). Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Presidential Approval (dichotomous)									
	All Experiments		New Chinese IO		Torture		Repel Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Adverse outcome treatment	-18.96*** (1.87)	-20.12*** (1.89)	-21.30*** (3.67)	-22.72*** (3.66)	-11.49*** (3.80)	-12.74*** (3.82)	-21.52*** (3.68)	-22.23*** (3.78)	-22.57*** (3.77)	-24.47*** (3.83)
High School		2.66 (5.51)		9.16 (9.80)		3.90 (13.01)		5.44 (10.30)		-8.85 (11.63)
Some college		1.94 (5.46)		11.61 (9.67)		0.76 (12.88)		4.62 (10.31)		-8.15 (11.50)
Associate degree		2.02 (5.82)		7.88 (10.44)		4.09 (13.40)		3.70 (11.05)		-6.79 (12.29)
Bachelor's degree		5.44 (5.57)		10.23 (10.00)		8.08 (13.06)		10.60 (10.52)		-7.90 (11.60)
Advanced degree		4.91 (5.84)		5.10 (10.52)		6.96 (13.61)		9.36 (10.86)		-0.69 (12.34)
Income		2.42*** (0.86)		5.58*** (1.67)		1.55 (1.73)		-0.35 (1.69)		2.58 (1.80)
Female		9.65*** (1.90)		12.21*** (3.68)		4.84 (3.83)		10.65*** (3.77)		10.79*** (3.90)
Age		-0.08 (0.06)		-0.18 (0.11)		-0.18 (0.11)		0.17 (0.11)		-0.15 (0.12)
Ideology		-3.53*** (0.56)		-4.60*** (1.10)		-5.20*** (1.11)		-1.49 (1.11)		-2.73** (1.13)
Constant	58.64*** (1.31)	62.95*** (6.05)	55.67*** (2.48)	54.23*** (10.70)	49.86*** (2.66)	68.08*** (13.57)	68.91*** (2.61)	56.39*** (11.84)	60.75*** (2.72)	74.91*** (12.96)
Observations	2,746	2,641	711	682	676	655	687	656	672	648
R ²	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.11	0.01	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.09

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5: Effect of treatment on expectations of decreased capabilities. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Expectations of Decreased Capabilities (dichotomous)							
	A New	Chinese IO	Torture		Repel the Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Adverse outcome treatment	23.14*** (3.29)	23.53*** (3.35)	9.14** (3.56)	9.40*** (3.55)	21.36*** (3.16)	20.46*** (3.17)	12.49*** (3.44)	12.70*** (3.49)
High School		7.70 (8.95)		−18.49 (12.10)		−20.89** (8.62)		7.30 (10.55)
Some college		1.75 (8.83)		−6.65 (11.99)		−21.22** (8.63)		18.76* (10.43)
Associate degree		10.48 (9.53)		−5.47 (12.47)		−29.30*** (9.26)		4.66 (11.14)
Bachelor’s degree		12.78 (9.12)		−7.49 (12.15)		−27.56*** (8.81)		12.83 (10.52)
Advanced degree		15.69 (9.60)		−14.97 (12.65)		−21.27** (9.09)		13.22 (11.19)
Income		−1.58 (1.52)		−0.13 (1.61)		0.42 (1.42)		−1.95 (1.64)
Female		−0.97 (3.36)		0.67 (3.57)		−6.19* (3.16)		−6.27* (3.54)
Age		0.20** (0.10)		0.47*** (0.11)		0.05 (0.09)		0.07 (0.11)
Ideology		2.14** (1.01)		2.68*** (1.03)		4.72*** (0.93)		4.75*** (1.03)
Constant	17.62*** (2.21)	−4.13 (9.77)	26.53*** (2.49)	5.37 (12.62)	12.76*** (2.24)	16.68* (9.91)	21.32*** (2.49)	−4.67 (11.76)
Observations	705	681	671	652	677	651	668	645
R ²	0.07	0.10	0.01	0.07	0.06	0.12	0.02	0.07

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A6: Effect of treatment on probability of future challenges from adversaries. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Expectations of future challenges from adversaries (dichotomous)							
	A New Chinese IO		Torture		Repel the Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Adverse outcome treatment	15.50*** (3.74)	15.48*** (3.80)	5.02 (3.83)	3.57 (3.92)	16.11*** (3.78)	17.11*** (3.83)	8.14** (3.85)	6.60* (3.95)
High School		3.07 (10.15)		−1.35 (13.34)		22.94** (10.44)		−12.47 (11.95)
Some college		−6.58 (10.01)		4.23 (13.21)		15.46 (10.45)		−12.68 (11.81)
Associate degree		−2.97 (10.83)		−0.85 (13.74)		−5.58 (11.20)		−23.18* (12.64)
Bachelor’s degree		−2.81 (10.36)		5.78 (13.40)		9.20 (10.66)		−18.42 (11.92)
Advanced degree		1.51 (10.89)		1.89 (13.97)		17.38 (11.01)		−0.58 (12.67)
Income		3.32* (1.73)		2.83 (1.78)		1.09 (1.71)		−0.71 (1.86)
Female		0.54 (3.82)		−2.69 (3.93)		−1.28 (3.82)		5.61 (4.02)
Age		−0.25** (0.12)		0.11 (0.12)		−0.28** (0.11)		−0.10 (0.12)
Ideology		−1.28 (1.14)		0.75 (1.14)		0.89 (1.12)		−0.23 (1.16)
Constant	47.40*** (2.51)	57.55*** (11.10)	53.64*** (2.68)	38.54*** (13.93)	43.36*** (2.68)	36.71*** (11.99)	50.31*** (2.79)	68.83*** (13.33)
Observations	702	678	672	653	682	656	667	644
R ²	0.02	0.05	0.003	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.01	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A7: Effect of treatment on perceptions of president being less competent. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Perceptions of president as less competent (dichotomous)							
	A New Chinese IO		Torture		Repel the Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Adverse outcome treatment	15.99*** (3.27)	16.07*** (3.29)	1.23 (3.45)	1.18 (3.43)	11.18*** (2.98)	10.90*** (2.99)	15.10*** (3.25)	15.28*** (3.29)
High School		−3.04 (8.79)		−2.13 (11.69)		−13.96* (8.13)		7.03 (9.97)
Some college		−7.55 (8.67)		7.86 (11.59)		−15.76* (8.14)		0.33 (9.86)
Associate degree		2.87 (9.37)		14.51 (12.05)		−15.19* (8.72)		−1.41 (10.53)
Bachelor’s degree		−4.71 (8.96)		9.58 (11.74)		−16.58** (8.31)		1.18 (9.94)
Advanced degree		0.40 (9.43)		9.95 (12.23)		−18.68** (8.58)		−5.75 (10.59)
Income		−1.78 (1.50)		−0.96 (1.56)		1.64 (1.33)		0.96 (1.55)
Female		0.75 (3.30)		−0.91 (3.45)		−2.96 (2.98)		−2.97 (3.35)
Age		−0.05 (0.10)		0.28*** (0.10)		0.13 (0.09)		−0.01 (0.10)
Ideology		5.59*** (0.99)		5.18*** (1.00)		4.77*** (0.87)		4.48*** (0.97)
Constant	18.70*** (2.20)	6.10 (9.60)	27.03*** (2.41)	−10.54 (12.20)	13.31*** (2.11)	0.91 (9.34)	15.94*** (2.35)	−3.64 (11.11)
Observations	705	681	673	654	681	655	668	645
R ²	0.03	0.08	0.0002	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.07

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4 Results with continuous coding of dependent variable

Table A8: Effect of treatment on expectations of decreased status (H1). Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Expectations of decreased status (continuous)									
	All Experiments		New Chinese IO		Torture		Repel Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Adverse outcome treatment	0.65*** (0.06)	0.69*** (0.06)	0.88*** (0.11)	0.90*** (0.11)	0.66*** (0.13)	0.67*** (0.13)	0.69*** (0.12)	0.72*** (0.12)	0.38*** (0.11)	0.44*** (0.11)
High School		−0.16 (0.17)		−0.11 (0.30)		−0.83* (0.43)		−0.18 (0.32)		0.26 (0.34)
Some college		−0.04 (0.17)		−0.04 (0.30)		−0.42 (0.42)		−0.18 (0.32)		0.23 (0.34)
Associate degree		−0.15 (0.18)		0.01 (0.32)		−0.57 (0.44)		−0.49 (0.34)		0.15 (0.36)
Bachelor’s degree		−0.07 (0.17)		0.09 (0.31)		−0.51 (0.43)		−0.40 (0.33)		0.25 (0.34)
Advanced degree		−0.31* (0.18)		0.08 (0.32)		−0.67 (0.45)		−0.58* (0.34)		−0.39 (0.36)
Income		−0.05* (0.03)		−0.09* (0.05)		−0.03 (0.06)		−0.03 (0.05)		−0.004 (0.05)
Female		−0.21*** (0.06)		−0.19* (0.11)		−0.14 (0.13)		−0.25** (0.12)		−0.22* (0.11)
Age		0.01*** (0.002)		0.01** (0.003)		0.02*** (0.004)		0.002 (0.003)		0.01** (0.003)
Ideology		0.14*** (0.02)		0.11*** (0.03)		0.15*** (0.04)		0.15*** (0.03)		0.14*** (0.03)
Constant	3.54*** (0.04)	2.88*** (0.19)	3.48*** (0.07)	2.99*** (0.33)	3.75*** (0.09)	2.99*** (0.45)	3.22*** (0.08)	3.01*** (0.37)	3.72*** (0.08)	2.72*** (0.38)
Observations	2,725	2,633	703	679	672	653	681	655	669	646
R ²	0.04	0.09	0.08	0.12	0.04	0.12	0.05	0.10	0.02	0.09

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A9: Effect of treatment on presidential approval (H2). Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Presidential Approval (continuous)									
	All Experiments		New Chinese IO		Torture		Repel Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Adverse outcome treatment	−0.71*** (0.06)	−0.75*** (0.06)	−0.66*** (0.12)	−0.68*** (0.12)	−0.57*** (0.14)	−0.63*** (0.14)	−0.78*** (0.11)	−0.80*** (0.11)	−0.85*** (0.12)	−0.92*** (0.12)
High School		0.06 (0.18)		−0.03 (0.33)		−0.29 (0.48)		0.60* (0.31)		−0.23 (0.35)
Some college		−0.01 (0.18)		0.08 (0.32)		−0.65 (0.47)		0.67** (0.31)		−0.22 (0.35)
Associate degree		−0.02 (0.19)		−0.02 (0.35)		−0.66 (0.49)		0.65* (0.34)		−0.17 (0.37)
Bachelor’s degree		0.11 (0.18)		0.11 (0.34)		−0.43 (0.48)		0.79** (0.32)		−0.20 (0.35)
Advanced degree		0.17 (0.19)		−0.10 (0.35)		−0.29 (0.50)		0.91*** (0.33)		−0.002 (0.38)
Income		0.06** (0.03)		0.11* (0.06)		0.05 (0.06)		0.01 (0.05)		0.09* (0.05)
Female		0.25*** (0.06)		0.21* (0.12)		0.20 (0.14)		0.34*** (0.11)		0.27** (0.12)
Age		−0.01*** (0.002)		−0.01* (0.004)		−0.01*** (0.004)		0.004 (0.003)		−0.01*** (0.004)
Ideology		−0.16*** (0.02)		−0.19*** (0.04)		−0.20*** (0.04)		−0.13*** (0.03)		−0.10*** (0.03)
Constant	4.76*** (0.04)	5.37*** (0.20)	4.71*** (0.08)	5.39*** (0.36)	4.39*** (0.10)	6.12*** (0.50)	5.14*** (0.08)	4.60*** (0.36)	4.82*** (0.08)	5.50*** (0.39)
Observations	2,746	2,641	711	682	676	655	687	656	672	648
R ²	0.05	0.09	0.04	0.10	0.02	0.10	0.06	0.12	0.07	0.12

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A10: Effect of treatment on expectations of decreased capabilities. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Expectations of decreased capabilities (continuous)							
	A New Chinese IO		Torture		Repel the Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Adverse outcome treatment	0.77*** (0.11)	0.77*** (0.11)	0.25** (0.12)	0.25** (0.12)	0.76*** (0.11)	0.74*** (0.11)	0.13 (0.10)	0.20* (0.10)
High School		-0.17 (0.29)		-0.43 (0.41)		-0.82*** (0.31)		0.26 (0.30)
Some college		-0.27 (0.29)		-0.08 (0.41)		-0.80** (0.31)		0.48 (0.30)
Associate degree		-0.05 (0.31)		0.03 (0.43)		-0.92*** (0.33)		0.15 (0.32)
Bachelor's degree		-0.08 (0.30)		-0.14 (0.42)		-1.00*** (0.32)		0.20 (0.30)
Advanced degree		-0.03 (0.32)		-0.33 (0.43)		-1.03*** (0.33)		-0.14 (0.32)
Income		-0.08 (0.05)		-0.05 (0.06)		-0.01 (0.05)		-0.02 (0.05)
Female		-0.11 (0.11)		-0.02 (0.12)		-0.21* (0.11)		-0.26** (0.10)
Age		0.01*** (0.003)		0.02*** (0.004)		0.002 (0.003)		0.01*** (0.003)
Ideology		0.09*** (0.03)		0.11*** (0.04)		0.15*** (0.03)		0.14*** (0.03)
Constant	3.39*** (0.07)	3.00*** (0.32)	3.81*** (0.09)	2.81*** (0.43)	3.25*** (0.08)	3.56*** (0.35)	3.78*** (0.07)	2.67*** (0.34)
Observations	705	681	671	652	677	651	668	645
R ²	0.07	0.10	0.01	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.003	0.10

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A11: Effect of treatment on probability of future challenges from adversaries. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Expectations of future challenges from adversaries (continuous)							
	A New Chinese IO		Torture		Repel the Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Adverse outcome treatment	0.49*** (0.11)	0.47*** (0.11)	0.001 (0.12)	−0.03 (0.12)	0.48*** (0.11)	0.50*** (0.11)	0.25** (0.11)	0.22** (0.11)
High School		−0.05 (0.29)		0.07 (0.42)		0.89*** (0.31)		−0.34 (0.33)
Some college		−0.20 (0.29)		0.21 (0.41)		0.78** (0.31)		−0.33 (0.33)
Associate degree		−0.17 (0.31)		0.02 (0.43)		0.18 (0.34)		−0.69** (0.35)
Bachelor’s degree		−0.16 (0.30)		0.15 (0.42)		0.62* (0.32)		−0.41 (0.33)
Advanced degree		−0.07 (0.31)		0.11 (0.44)		0.76** (0.33)		−0.11 (0.35)
Income		0.09* (0.05)		0.03 (0.06)		0.05 (0.05)		−0.08 (0.05)
Female		−0.03 (0.11)		−0.21* (0.12)		−0.07 (0.11)		0.17 (0.11)
Age		−0.01** (0.003)		0.01 (0.004)		−0.01*** (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)
Ideology		−0.05 (0.03)		0.02 (0.04)		−0.03 (0.03)		−0.05 (0.03)
Constant	4.40*** (0.07)	4.87*** (0.32)	4.74*** (0.08)	4.32*** (0.44)	4.28*** (0.08)	4.18*** (0.36)	4.52*** (0.08)	5.15*** (0.37)
Observations	702	678	672	653	682	656	667	644
R ²	0.03	0.04	0.0000	0.01	0.03	0.08	0.01	0.03

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A12: Effect of treatment on perceptions of president being less competent. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Perceptions of president as less competent (continuous)							
	A New Chinese IO		Torture		Repel the Attacker		Embassy Closure	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Adverse outcome treatment	0.48*** (0.12)	0.51*** (0.12)	0.13 (0.13)	0.15 (0.13)	0.52*** (0.12)	0.54*** (0.12)	0.51*** (0.12)	0.60*** (0.12)
High School		-0.21 (0.31)		-0.14 (0.44)		-0.77** (0.32)		0.16 (0.35)
Some college		-0.24 (0.31)		0.11 (0.43)		-0.87*** (0.32)		0.07 (0.35)
Associate degree		-0.15 (0.33)		0.15 (0.45)		-0.79** (0.34)		0.04 (0.37)
Bachelor's degree		-0.23 (0.32)		0.33 (0.44)		-0.96*** (0.33)		0.10 (0.35)
Advanced degree		-0.34 (0.34)		0.04 (0.46)		-1.09*** (0.34)		-0.42 (0.37)
Income		-0.07 (0.05)		-0.08 (0.06)		-0.01 (0.05)		0.03 (0.05)
Female		-0.17 (0.12)		-0.13 (0.13)		-0.29** (0.12)		-0.26** (0.12)
Age		0.01* (0.004)		0.02*** (0.004)		0.01* (0.003)		0.01*** (0.004)
Ideology		0.22*** (0.04)		0.25*** (0.04)		0.17*** (0.03)		0.16*** (0.03)
Constant	3.56*** (0.08)	2.89*** (0.34)	3.82*** (0.09)	2.28*** (0.45)	3.23*** (0.08)	3.26*** (0.37)	3.42*** (0.08)	2.32*** (0.39)
Observations	705	681	673	654	681	655	668	645
R ²	0.02	0.09	0.001	0.11	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.10

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A13: Mediation analysis. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Presidential Approval (continuous)				
	All experiments	A New Chinese IO	Torture	Repel the Attacker	Embassy Closure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Adverse outcome treatment	−0.32*** (0.05)	−0.09 (0.10)	−0.38*** (0.11)	−0.34*** (0.10)	−0.55*** (0.09)
Expect decreased status	−0.29*** (0.02)	−0.30*** (0.04)	−0.24*** (0.05)	−0.26*** (0.04)	−0.35*** (0.04)
Decreased capabilities	−0.10*** (0.02)	−0.11** (0.05)	−0.10** (0.05)	−0.15*** (0.05)	−0.07 (0.05)
Leader competence	−0.39*** (0.02)	−0.44*** (0.04)	−0.46*** (0.04)	−0.24*** (0.04)	−0.38*** (0.04)
Degrade deterrence	−0.07*** (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.12*** (0.04)	−0.07** (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
High School	−0.12 (0.14)	−0.18 (0.24)	−0.59 (0.36)	0.31 (0.26)	−0.07 (0.26)
Some college	−0.15 (0.14)	−0.08 (0.24)	−0.67* (0.36)	0.34 (0.26)	−0.13 (0.26)
Associate degree	−0.18 (0.15)	−0.09 (0.26)	−0.69* (0.37)	0.20 (0.28)	−0.11 (0.28)
Bachelor’s degree	−0.03 (0.14)	0.01 (0.25)	−0.39 (0.36)	0.33 (0.27)	−0.09 (0.26)
Advanced degree	−0.16 (0.15)	−0.25 (0.26)	−0.45 (0.38)	0.38 (0.28)	−0.35 (0.28)
Income	0.04* (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	−0.001 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.11*** (0.04)
Female	0.10** (0.05)	0.06 (0.09)	0.10 (0.11)	0.18* (0.10)	0.09 (0.09)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	−0.0001 (0.003)	−0.0003 (0.003)	0.01* (0.003)	−0.002 (0.003)
Ideology	−0.03** (0.01)	−0.06** (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Constant	7.94*** (0.18)	8.09*** (0.33)	8.71*** (0.41)	6.99*** (0.35)	7.68*** (0.35)
Observations	2,606	674	647	649	636
R ²	0.48	0.52	0.50	0.41	0.53

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A14: Mediation analysis with status concerns only. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable: Presidential Approval (continuous)				
	All experiments	A New Chinese IO	Torture	Repel the Attacker	Embassy Closure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Adverse outcome treatment	−0.36*** (0.05)	−0.13 (0.11)	−0.24* (0.12)	−0.44*** (0.10)	−0.66*** (0.10)
Expect decreased status	−0.59*** (0.02)	−0.62*** (0.03)	−0.60*** (0.04)	−0.50*** (0.03)	−0.60*** (0.03)
High School	−0.03 (0.15)	−0.10 (0.27)	−0.79* (0.41)	0.52* (0.27)	−0.07 (0.29)
Some college	−0.04 (0.15)	0.05 (0.27)	−0.90** (0.40)	0.58** (0.27)	−0.11 (0.28)
Associate degree	−0.11 (0.16)	−0.01 (0.29)	−0.97** (0.42)	0.40 (0.29)	−0.09 (0.30)
Bachelor’s degree	0.06 (0.15)	0.16 (0.28)	−0.74* (0.41)	0.59** (0.28)	−0.06 (0.29)
Advanced degree	−0.02 (0.16)	−0.08 (0.29)	−0.68 (0.42)	0.62** (0.29)	−0.25 (0.31)
Income	0.04 (0.02)	0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	−0.001 (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)
Female	0.13** (0.05)	0.08 (0.10)	0.12 (0.12)	0.22** (0.10)	0.15 (0.10)
Age	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.003)	−0.003 (0.004)	0.01* (0.003)	−0.005 (0.003)
Ideology	−0.08*** (0.02)	−0.13*** (0.03)	−0.11*** (0.03)	−0.05* (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
Constant	7.06*** (0.17)	7.23*** (0.31)	7.91*** (0.44)	6.10*** (0.33)	7.16*** (0.33)
Observations	2,633	679	653	655	646
R ²	0.37	0.39	0.36	0.34	0.42

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C Replication on Mechanical Turk

C.1 Protocol

We re-fielded the *Repel the Attacker* and *A New Chinese IO* scenarios from the SSI sample on a sample recruited on Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk service (MTURK). In this case, all respondents participated in both experiments in a random order. We posted an ad on MTURK inviting respondents to take a survey for which we would pay \$1.00. While mTurk is now a well-established source of data for those conducting survey experiments across the social sciences, there has been some discussion in recent months about data quality. The key concern recently is the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) to get around geographic restrictions and the use of bots. To guard against this we implemented the protocol proposed by Kennedy et al. (2018) which both warns respondents against attempting to answer the survey from outside of the U.S. and checks the IP address of the respondent against a list of known or suspected VPN providers. All respondents read a common introduction adapted from Tomz and Weeks (2013):

There’s a lot of talk these days about U.S. military and economic policies abroad. We’d like to get your thoughts on some of these issues. We are going to describe several situations that the U.S. could face in the future. Some parts of the description may strike you as important; other parts may seem unimportant. We will describe one way in which a future U.S. president might respond to the situation and then ask whether you approve or disapprove and a number of other questions.

Respondents then participated in both scenario-based experiments in a random order. The scenarios relied on the same wording as that seen by respondents in the SSI sample. We departed from the SSI protocol two ways. First, we prefaced each scenario with, “Consider how you might feel if the U.S. faced the following situation 10 years from now.” And second, respondents read the scenario and then on the next page, we presented the scenario to the respondent again along with questions about the dependent variable and mechanisms.

C.2 Demographics

Variable	Levels	n	%
Education	Up to some high school	11	1.0
	High School graduate or equivalent (GED)	107	9.8
	Some college, but did not complete a degree	275	25.1
	Associate degree	125	11.4
	Bachelor's degree	405	37.0
	Advanced degree	171	15.6
	all	1094	100.0
Gender	Male	546	49.9
	Female	545	49.8
	Other	3	0.3
	all	1094	100.0
Income	Up to 29,999	267	24.4
	30,000-59,999	398	36.4
	60,000-99,999	277	25.3
	100,000-149,999	103	9.4
	More than 150,000	48	4.4
	all	1093	100.0
Age	18-29	325	29.8
	30-39	373	34.2
	40-49	169	15.5
	50-59	131	12.0
	60-69	78	7.1
	70+	16	1.5
	all	1092	100.0
Region	Northeast	222	20.3
	Midwest	222	20.3
	South and Central	421	38.5
	West	227	20.8
	all	1092	100.0

Table A15: Distribution of demographic variables (mTurk replication)

C.3 Manipulation Check

We included a factual manipulation check in the mTurk replication. The respondent was asked to recall the outcome of the scenarios. The check for the Chinese-led IO experiment read, "What was the outcome of the situation related to the new Chinese-led international organization?" The response options were: 1) The United Kingdom joined, 2) The United Kingdom stayed out, 3) I don't recall. Similarly, the check for the *Repel the Attacker* experiment read, "What was the outcome of the situation related to the attack by one country on another country?" The response options were: 1) The attacking state agreed to a ceasefire and withdrew its forces, 2) The attacking state DID NOT agree to a ceasefire and DID NOT withdraw its forces, and 3) I do not recall. For each experiment, we code those who correctly answered the manipulation check question as passing the manipulation check and those who answered incorrectly or reported that they did not recall as failing the manipulation check. The results, Table A16 show that our respondents paid close attention to the manipulations with about 90 and 94 percent of respondents correctly recalling the their randomly assigned outcome in the *New Chinese IO* and *Repel the Attacker* scenarios respectively.

Variable	Levels	n	%
New.Chinese.led.IO	Passed	980	89.6
	Failed	114	10.4
	all	1094	100.0
Repel.the.attacker	Passed	1031	94.2
	Failed	63	5.8
	all	1094	100.0

Table A16: Manipulation check results (mTurk replication)

C.4 Results with dichotomous coding of dependent variable - MTURK

Table A17: Effect of treatment on expectations of decreased status (H1). Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.” Standard errors clustered by respondent in the groups models.

	Dependent Variable: Expectations of Decreased Status					
	Both Experiments		New Chinese IO		Repel the Attacker	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Adverse outcome treatment	64.21*** (1.66)	64.40*** (1.67)	72.79*** (2.06)	73.20*** (2.06)	54.41*** (2.24)	54.66*** (2.26)
High School		−5.32 (12.88)		−3.33 (10.78)		−5.89 (11.78)
Some college		0.44 (12.67)		2.79 (10.49)		−0.39 (11.46)
Associate degree		−4.35 (12.76)		1.68 (10.73)		−8.75 (11.73)
Bachelor’s degree (BA/BS)		−0.75 (12.66)		3.11 (10.47)		−3.23 (11.45)
Advanced degree		−2.96 (12.78)		2.81 (10.74)		−6.07 (11.73)
Income		1.19 (0.77)		0.07 (1.03)		2.24** (1.13)
Female		−2.98* (1.57)		−3.83* (2.07)		−2.70 (2.26)
Age		0.09 (0.06)		−0.03 (0.08)		0.17* (0.09)
Ideology		−0.51 (0.45)		−1.46** (0.59)		0.52 (0.65)
Constant	8.10*** (0.82)	6.70 (13.26)	11.95*** (1.47)	17.48 (10.94)	4.49*** (1.54)	−4.30 (11.95)
Observations	2,221	2,186	1,114	1,093	1,107	1,093
R ²	0.43	0.44	0.53	0.54	0.35	0.36

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A18: Effect of treatment on presidential approval (H2). Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.” Standard errors clustered by respondent in the groups models.

	Dependent Variable: Presidential Approval					
	Both Experiments		New Chinese IO		Repel the Attacker	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Adverse outcome treatment	−53.40*** (1.84)	−53.16*** (1.86)	−56.85*** (2.44)	−56.75*** (2.43)	−48.39*** (2.40)	−48.11*** (2.43)
High School		−22.19*** (6.61)		−29.24** (12.70)		−15.64 (12.67)
Some college		−17.81*** (6.20)		−29.92** (12.36)		−6.26 (12.33)
Associate degree		−19.04*** (6.43)		−33.22*** (12.65)		−5.48 (12.62)
Bachelor’s degree (BA/BS)		−22.01*** (6.19)		−36.99*** (12.34)		−7.52 (12.31)
Advanced degree		−19.99*** (6.43)		−34.20*** (12.66)		−6.85 (12.61)
Income		−0.78 (0.88)		0.56 (1.22)		−2.11* (1.21)
Female		3.58** (1.78)		3.49 (2.44)		3.94 (2.43)
Age		0.11 (0.07)		0.20** (0.10)		0.03 (0.10)
Ideology		1.36*** (0.52)		3.04*** (0.70)		−0.34 (0.70)
Constant	82.46*** (1.16)	93.44*** (6.68)	73.16*** (1.75)	84.79*** (12.90)	91.19*** (1.66)	101.47*** (12.85)
Observations	2,221	2,186	1,114	1,093	1,107	1,093
R ²	0.29	0.30	0.33	0.36	0.27	0.28

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table A19: Effect of treatment on other concepts in New Chinese IO Experiment. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable:									
	Decreased status (H1)		Prez. approval (H2)		Less competent		Increase Challenges		Decrease Capabilities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Adverse outcome treatment	72.79*** (2.06)	73.20*** (2.06)	−56.85*** (2.44)	−56.75*** (2.43)	55.29*** (2.34)	55.66*** (2.35)	53.45*** (2.51)	53.50*** (2.54)	71.80*** (2.05)	72.09*** (2.06)
High School		−3.33 (10.78)		−29.24** (12.70)		16.60 (12.26)		−16.44 (13.24)		−16.11 (10.76)
Some college		2.79 (10.49)		−29.92** (12.36)		19.87* (11.93)		−14.31 (12.88)		−13.55 (10.47)
Associate degree		1.68 (10.73)		−33.22*** (12.65)		18.83 (12.21)		−13.92 (13.19)		−17.46 (10.71)
Bachelor’s degree (BA/BS)		3.11 (10.47)		−36.99*** (12.34)		19.32 (11.92)		−16.69 (12.87)		−13.07 (10.46)
Advanced degree		2.81 (10.74)		−34.20*** (12.66)		14.83 (12.22)		−20.13 (13.19)		−14.10 (10.72)
Income		0.07 (1.03)		0.56 (1.22)		1.46 (1.17)		1.99 (1.27)		0.70 (1.03)
Female		−3.83* (2.07)		3.49 (2.44)		−1.20 (2.35)		0.36 (2.54)		−2.69 (2.06)
Age		−0.03 (0.08)		0.20** (0.10)		0.01 (0.09)		−0.19* (0.10)		0.02 (0.08)
Ideology		−1.46** (0.59)		3.04*** (0.70)		−2.54*** (0.68)		−0.58 (0.73)		−1.47** (0.59)
Constant	11.95*** (1.47)	17.48 (10.94)	73.16*** (1.75)	84.79*** (12.90)	7.17*** (1.68)	−5.76 (12.45)	28.13*** (1.80)	48.87*** (13.45)	6.62*** (1.47)	24.84** (10.93)
Observations	1,114	1,093	1,114	1,093	1,114	1,093	1,114	1,093	1,114	1,093
R ²	0.53	0.54	0.33	0.36	0.33	0.36	0.29	0.30	0.52	0.54

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A20: Effect of treatment on other concepts in Repel the Attacker experiment. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable:									
	Decreased status (H1)		Prez. approval (H2)		Less competent		Increase Challenges		Decrease Capabilities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Adverse outcome treatment	54.41*** (2.24)	54.66*** (2.26)	−48.39*** (2.40)	−48.11*** (2.43)	33.58*** (2.12)	33.88*** (2.14)	55.54*** (2.48)	55.96*** (2.51)	53.72*** (2.26)	53.95*** (2.29)
High School		−5.89 (11.78)		−15.64 (12.67)		13.05 (11.16)		22.50* (13.06)		6.33 (11.95)
Some college		−0.39 (11.46)		−6.26 (12.33)		12.12 (10.86)		18.52 (12.71)		7.72 (11.63)
Associate degree		−8.75 (11.73)		−5.48 (12.62)		6.41 (11.12)		20.41 (13.01)		7.66 (11.90)
Bachelor’s degree (BA/BS)		−3.23 (11.45)		−7.52 (12.31)		12.60 (10.85)		19.73 (12.70)		6.28 (11.61)
Advanced degree		−6.07 (11.73)		−6.85 (12.61)		11.13 (11.11)		17.68 (13.01)		8.69 (11.90)
Income		2.24** (1.13)		−2.11* (1.21)		0.66 (1.07)		1.93 (1.25)		0.88 (1.14)
Female		−2.70 (2.26)		3.94 (2.43)		−1.26 (2.15)		0.59 (2.51)		−2.28 (2.30)
Age		0.17* (0.09)		0.03 (0.10)		0.18** (0.09)		−0.003 (0.10)		0.12 (0.09)
Ideology		0.52 (0.65)		−0.34 (0.70)		1.47** (0.62)		0.72 (0.72)		1.25* (0.66)
Constant	4.49*** (1.54)	−4.30 (11.95)	91.19*** (1.66)	101.47*** (12.85)	2.59* (1.46)	−21.87* (11.32)	18.13*** (1.72)	−8.81 (13.25)	5.18*** (1.56)	−11.86 (12.12)
Observations	1,107	1,093	1,107	1,093	1,107	1,093	1,107	1,093	1,107	1,093
R ²	0.35	0.36	0.27	0.28	0.19	0.20	0.31	0.32	0.34	0.34

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.5 Results with continuous coding of dependent variable - MTURK

Table A21: Effect of treatment on expectations of decreased status (H1). Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.” Standard errors clustered by respondent in the Model 1.

	Dependent Variable: Expectations of Decreased Status					
	Both Experiments		New Chinese IO		Repel the Attacker	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Adverse outcome treatment	2.43*** (0.06)	2.44*** (0.06)	2.54*** (0.07)	2.55*** (0.07)	2.26*** (0.08)	2.28*** (0.08)
High School		-0.25 (0.37)		-0.13 (0.38)		-0.35 (0.42)
Some college		-0.19 (0.36)		-0.14 (0.37)		-0.22 (0.40)
Associate degree		-0.34 (0.37)		-0.17 (0.38)		-0.49 (0.41)
Bachelor’s degree (BA/BS)		-0.23 (0.36)		-0.10 (0.37)		-0.33 (0.40)
Advanced degree		-0.34 (0.37)		-0.21 (0.38)		-0.44 (0.41)
Income		0.04* (0.03)		0.04 (0.04)		0.04 (0.04)
Female		-0.16*** (0.06)		-0.19*** (0.07)		-0.13* (0.08)
Age		0.004 (0.002)		0.003 (0.003)		0.004 (0.003)
Ideology		-0.05*** (0.02)		-0.09*** (0.02)		-0.001 (0.02)
Constant	2.64*** (0.04)	2.86*** (0.38)	2.93*** (0.05)	3.27*** (0.39)	2.36*** (0.05)	2.47*** (0.42)
Observations	2,221	2,186	1,114	1,093	1,107	1,093
R ²	0.46	0.47	0.52	0.54	0.43	0.44

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A22: Effect of treatment on presidential approval (H2). Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.” Standard errors clustered by respondent in the groups models.

	Dependent Variable: Presidential Approval					
	Both Experiments		New Chinese IO		Repel the Attacker	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Adverse outcome treatment	−2.22*** (0.07)	−2.24*** (0.07)	−2.35*** (0.09)	−2.36*** (0.09)	−2.03*** (0.09)	−2.04*** (0.09)
High School		−0.67* (0.37)		−0.70 (0.46)		−0.65 (0.45)
Some college		−0.55 (0.36)		−0.70 (0.45)		−0.41 (0.44)
Associate degree		−0.57 (0.36)		−0.77* (0.46)		−0.38 (0.45)
Bachelor’s degree (BA/BS)		−0.67* (0.36)		−0.87* (0.45)		−0.48 (0.44)
Advanced degree		−0.57 (0.36)		−0.76* (0.46)		−0.41 (0.45)
Income		−0.03 (0.03)		−0.001 (0.04)		−0.06 (0.04)
Female		0.17*** (0.06)		0.18** (0.09)		0.17* (0.09)
Age		−0.0001 (0.003)		0.003 (0.004)		−0.003 (0.003)
Ideology		0.07*** (0.02)		0.16*** (0.03)		−0.02 (0.02)
Constant	5.72*** (0.04)	6.07*** (0.37)	5.31*** (0.06)	5.33*** (0.47)	6.10*** (0.06)	6.79*** (0.45)
Observations	2,221	2,186	1,114	1,093	1,107	1,093
R ²	0.34	0.36	0.38	0.42	0.34	0.35

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A23: Effect of treatment on other concerns in New Chinese IO Experiment. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable:									
	Decreased status (H1)		Prez. approval (H2)		Less competent		Increase Challenges		Decrease Capabilities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Adverse outcome treatment	2.54*** (0.07)	2.55*** (0.07)	-2.35*** (0.09)	-2.36*** (0.09)	2.05*** (0.08)	2.07*** (0.08)	1.83*** (0.08)	1.84*** (0.08)	2.39*** (0.07)	2.40*** (0.07)
High School		-0.13 (0.38)		-0.70 (0.46)		0.62 (0.41)		-0.02 (0.43)		-0.15 (0.38)
Some college		-0.14 (0.37)		-0.70 (0.45)		0.62 (0.40)		0.004 (0.42)		-0.22 (0.37)
Associate degree		-0.17 (0.38)		-0.77* (0.46)		0.56 (0.41)		0.09 (0.43)		-0.32 (0.38)
Bachelor's degree (BA/BS)		-0.10 (0.37)		-0.87* (0.45)		0.69* (0.40)		-0.001 (0.42)		-0.29 (0.37)
Advanced degree		-0.21 (0.38)		-0.76* (0.46)		0.58 (0.41)		-0.18 (0.43)		-0.36 (0.38)
Income		0.04 (0.04)		-0.001 (0.04)		0.05 (0.04)		0.04 (0.04)		0.06* (0.04)
Female		-0.19*** (0.07)		0.18** (0.09)		-0.03 (0.08)		-0.05 (0.08)		-0.19*** (0.07)
Age		0.003 (0.003)		0.003 (0.004)		0.001 (0.003)		-0.005 (0.003)		0.003 (0.003)
Ideology		-0.09*** (0.02)		0.16*** (0.03)		-0.11*** (0.02)		-0.04* (0.02)		-0.07*** (0.02)
Constant	2.93*** (0.05)	3.27*** (0.39)	5.31*** (0.06)	5.33*** (0.47)	2.94*** (0.06)	2.54*** (0.41)	3.58*** (0.06)	3.84*** (0.44)	2.84*** (0.05)	3.18*** (0.39)
Observations	1,114	1,093	1,114	1,093	1,114	1,093	1,114	1,093	1,114	1,093
R ²	0.52	0.54	0.38	0.42	0.38	0.41	0.31	0.32	0.49	0.51

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A24: Effect of treatment on other concerns in Repel the Attacker experiment. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	Dependent Variable:									
	Decreased status (H1)		Prez. approval (H2)		Less competent		Increase Challenges		Decrease Capabilities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Adverse outcome treatment	2.26*** (0.08)	2.28*** (0.08)	−2.03*** (0.09)	−2.04*** (0.09)	1.84*** (0.08)	1.87*** (0.08)	2.01*** (0.09)	2.02*** (0.09)	2.07*** (0.08)	2.08*** (0.08)
High School		−0.35 (0.42)		−0.65 (0.45)		0.28 (0.42)		0.47 (0.45)		0.04 (0.41)
Some college		−0.22 (0.40)		−0.41 (0.44)		0.12 (0.41)		0.27 (0.43)		0.12 (0.40)
Associate degree		−0.49 (0.41)		−0.38 (0.45)		−0.04 (0.42)		0.33 (0.44)		0.12 (0.41)
Bachelor’s degree (BA/BS)		−0.33 (0.40)		−0.48 (0.44)		0.14 (0.41)		0.36 (0.43)		0.17 (0.40)
Advanced degree		−0.44 (0.41)		−0.41 (0.45)		0.05 (0.42)		0.30 (0.44)		0.17 (0.41)
Income		0.04 (0.04)		−0.06 (0.04)		0.04 (0.04)		0.09** (0.04)		0.02 (0.04)
Female		−0.13* (0.08)		0.17* (0.09)		−0.02 (0.08)		−0.01 (0.09)		−0.16** (0.08)
Age		0.004 (0.003)		−0.003 (0.003)		0.01*** (0.003)		−0.001 (0.003)		0.002 (0.003)
Ideology		−0.001 (0.02)		−0.02 (0.02)		0.04 (0.02)		−0.003 (0.02)		0.003 (0.02)
Constant	2.36*** (0.05)	2.47*** (0.42)	6.10*** (0.06)	6.79*** (0.45)	2.36*** (0.06)	1.57*** (0.43)	3.13*** (0.06)	2.64*** (0.45)	2.53*** (0.05)	2.34*** (0.42)
Observations	1,107	1,093	1,107	1,093	1,107	1,093	1,107	1,093	1,107	1,093
R ²	0.43	0.44	0.34	0.35	0.32	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.39	0.39

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A25: Mediation analysis. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.” Standard errors clustered by respondent in the first model.

	Dependent Variable (continuous):		
	Both exeriments	Repel the Attacker	New Chinese IO
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Adverse outcome treatment	−0.12 (0.07)	−0.19** (0.09)	−0.23** (0.10)
Expectations of decreased status	−0.34*** (0.03)	−0.29*** (0.04)	−0.33*** (0.04)
Leader competence	−0.48*** (0.03)	−0.44*** (0.03)	−0.48*** (0.03)
Degrade deterrence	−0.08*** (0.02)	−0.07*** (0.02)	−0.08*** (0.03)
Decrease power	−0.07** (0.03)	−0.10*** (0.03)	−0.06 (0.04)
High School	−0.52 (0.39)	−0.59* (0.31)	−0.46 (0.34)
Some college	−0.43 (0.38)	−0.39 (0.31)	−0.46 (0.33)
Associate degree	−0.55 (0.38)	−0.50 (0.31)	−0.57* (0.34)
Bachelor’s degree (BA/BS)	−0.54 (0.38)	−0.48 (0.31)	−0.59* (0.33)
Advanced degree	−0.54 (0.39)	−0.48 (0.31)	−0.59* (0.34)
Income	0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Female	0.09* (0.05)	0.10* (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)
Age	0.004** (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Ideology	0.03** (0.01)	−0.003 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Constant	8.50*** (0.40)	8.64*** (0.33)	8.13*** (0.36)
Observations	2,186	1,093	1,093
R ²	0.70	0.68	0.69

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A26: Mediation analysis with status concerns only. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.” Standard errors clustered by respondent in the first model.

	Dependent Variable (continuous):		
	Both exeriments	Repel the Attacker	New Chinese IO
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Adverse outcome treatment	−0.44*** (0.08)	−0.50*** (0.09)	−0.61*** (0.11)
Expectations of decreased status	−0.74*** (0.02)	−0.68*** (0.03)	−0.69*** (0.03)
High School	−0.85* (0.45)	−0.89** (0.35)	−0.79** (0.38)
Some college	−0.68 (0.45)	−0.56* (0.34)	−0.80** (0.37)
Associate degree	−0.82* (0.45)	−0.71** (0.35)	−0.89** (0.38)
Bachelor’s degree (BA/BS)	−0.84* (0.45)	−0.71** (0.34)	−0.94** (0.37)
Advanced degree	−0.82* (0.45)	−0.71** (0.35)	−0.90** (0.38)
Income	0.003 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)
Female	0.05 (0.05)	0.08 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
Age	0.003 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)
Ideology	0.04** (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Constant	8.18*** (0.46)	8.46*** (0.36)	7.57*** (0.40)
Observations	2,186	1,093	1,093
R ²	0.62	0.61	0.61

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.6 Comparison between mturk replication and initial SSI results

Readers will likely note that we found significantly larger effects in our MTURK replications than we did in our original study based on respondents recruited by SSI. These differences in magnitude of effect sizes are not uncommon when comparing the results of experiments run on MTURK samples to those run on samples drawn from other sources. Coppock (2019) shows via replications of a number of survey experiments on MTURK that while not the rule, larger effects among mturk samples occur regularly. In the present context, we believe at least two factors contributed to these differences in effect sizes and we discuss each in turn. First, past work shows that MTURK respondents pay closer attention to surveys in which they participate than do SSI respondents (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012).

While we do not have a direct measure of attention in our SSI sample, the attention checks in Section D.3 show that our mTurkers were paying very close attention to the details of the scenario, with 94 percent of respondents passing the MTURK check in the *Repel the Attacker* experiment and 89 percent doing so for the *New Chinese IO experiment*. The difference in attention between our SSI sample and our MTURK was likely exaggerated in our case because our SSI study was fielded as part of much larger 15-20 minute survey while our MTURK replication was a standalone study lasting only a few minutes.

Second, there were several differences in the protocol. In the SSI experiment, respondents were exposed to the scenario *once* before we measured approval and status concerns. In the MTURK study, we exposed respondents *twice*. They read the scenario on a page with no other survey questions, then we reminded them of the details of the scenario on the subsequent page. The version of the treatment we used in the MTURK study follows the lead of several well-known scenario-based survey experiment studies (e.g., Tomz and Weeks 2013). Additionally, we asked respondents to imagine that the scenario happened a decade from now.

We explored the possibility that observable differences in the demographic characteristics of the two samples might explain a portion of this difference, but it does not appear to be the case. We matched respondents in the SSI sample to respondents in the MTURK sample who were similar on gender, age, education, income, and region using nearest neighbor one-to-one matching as implemented by Ho et al. (2011). While the samples were not especially unbalanced, this had the effect of trimming the SSI sample to reflect the observable demographic characteristics of the MTURK sample. We then re-ran our analyses on these two smaller and more balanced samples. We found few differences in the magnitude of the effect sizes we observed in either the mTurk or SSI samples. For example, the results presented in Table A27 show that, after matching, we find similar differences in effect sizes across samples for the *Repel the Attacker* scenario.

D Embedded Natural Experiment - MTURK

D.1 Protocol

We begin the manipulation by outlining a scenario in which U.S. status or prestige is on the line but fix the policy choices and behavior of the president. All respondents read the following introduction:

U.S. intent on keeping other western countries out of new Chinese-led international organization The U.S. helped create and plays the dominant role in a number of international organizations that help stimulate economic development in other countries.

Table A27: Effect of treatment on on approval for the Repel the Attacker scenario in mturk and SSI after balancing on gender, age, edu, and region.

	Dependent Variable:			
	Decreased status mTurk	SSI	Prez. Approval mTurk	SSI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Decreased status	53.45*** (2.92)	16.83*** (3.36)	-49.10*** (3.16)	-21.30*** (3.77)
Constant	4.14** (2.03)	17.33*** (2.37)	90.24*** (2.20)	69.00*** (2.66)
Observations	654	654	654	654
R ²	0.34	0.04	0.27	0.05
<i>Note:</i>			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

China is creating a new international organization to compete with existing U.S.-led international organizations. The U.S. president, who happens to be a [Democrat/Republican], views this new Chinese-led organization as a challenge to U.S. leadership around the world.

Hoping to limit the new organization’s influence, the President repeatedly pressed a close ally, the United Kingdom, to refuse any role in the organization. The President’s lobbying efforts were not successful and the United Kingdom remained intent on joining the new Chinese-led organization.

Respondents are then be randomly assigned to one of two conditions:

1. The “favorable” condition reads: “United Kingdom does not join new Chinese-led international organization because of a budget crisis. Just prior to the United Kingdom’s formal application for membership, a substantial and unexpected budget crisis hit the United Kingdom. As a result, the United Kingdom did not join the new organization and the new Chinese-led international organization lacked any western members. Without the United Kingdom as a member, the new organization represents almost no challenge to U.S. influence in world affairs. ”
2. The “unfavorable” condition reads: “United Kingdom joins new Chinese-led international organization despite a budget crisis. Just prior to the United Kingdom’s formal application for membership, a substantial and unexpected budget crisis hit the United Kingdom. Despite this, the United Kingdom was able to join the new organization and the new Chinese-led international organization gained an important western member. With the United Kingdom as a member, the new organization represents a significant challenge to U.S. influence in world affairs. ”

Following treatment, we measured the same set of outcome variables as in the first set of experiments.

D.2 Demographics

Variable	Levels	n	%
Education	Advanced degree	169	14.9
	Associate degree	122	10.8
	Bachelor’s degree	466	41.1
	High School graduate or equivalent (GED)	140	12.3
	Some college, but did not complete a degree	232	20.4
	Up to some high school	6	0.5
	all	1135	100.0
Gender	Male	590	52.0
	Female	540	47.6
	Other	5	0.4
	all	1135	100.0
Income	Up to 29,999	279	24.6
	30,000-59,999	390	34.4
	60,000-99,999	307	27.1
	100,000-149,999	108	9.5
	More than 150,000	51	4.5
	all	1135	100.0
Age	18–29	333	29.4
	30–39	398	35.1
	40–49	205	18.1
	50–59	121	10.7
	60–69	67	5.9
	70+	9	0.8
	all	1133	100.0
Region	Northeast	205	18.1
	Midwest	262	23.1
	South and Central	414	36.5
	West	254	22.4
	all	1135	100.0

Table A28: Distribution of demographic variables (mTurk ENE)

D.3 Manipulation Check

We included a factual manipulation check in which the respondent was asked to recall the outcome of the scenario. The check read, “Recall the scenario about which you read on the previous page... Did the United Kingdom end up joining or staying out of the new Chinese-led international organization?” The response options were: 1) The United Kingdom joined, 2) The United Kingdom stayed out, 3) I don’t recall. We code those who correctly answered this question as passing the manipulation check and those who answered incorrectly or reported that they did not recall as failing the manipulation check.

Variable	Levels	n	%
Manipulation.Check	Passed	1059	92.8
	Failed	82	7.2
	all	1141	100.0

Table A29: Manipulation check results (mTurk ENE)

D.4 Results

We pre-registered the analysis of this experiment with EGAP as study #20180321AA (url: <https://egap.org/registration/4382>). In our pre-analysis plan (PAP), we explain that we will test for treatment effects on our dependent variable of interest (presidential approval), our mediator of interest (status concerns), and three other causal mechanisms (competence, deterrence, and power). In the experiment, the outcome of the scenario was exogenous to perceptions of both the president and the U.S. as a whole. Thus, we expected the outcome of the scenario to affect concerns about status (as a leader of the world’s important international institutions), but leave perceptions of the president and the state’s reputation unchanged. We summarized the hypotheses in our PAP as:

- (main effect on DV): Presidential approval will be higher in the “no membership” condition than in the “membership condition”.
- (main effect on mediator of interest): Those in the “membership condition” will be more likely to report that the outcome of the scenario decreased U.S. status.
- (mediated effect): The effect of the “membership condition” will be mediated through respondent concerns about declining status/prestige of the U.S.
- (main effect on competence mediator): Concerns about the competency of the U.S. president will be unaffected by treatment.
- (main effect on power mediator): Concerns about the material power and capabilities of the U.S. will be unaffected by treatment.
- (main effect on deterrence mediator): Concerns about the ability of the U.S. to deter future challengers will be unaffected by treatment.

We test these hypotheses in Tables [A31](#), [A30](#), [A32](#). We present estimates of the mediation effects in the main text using the product-of-coefficients approach. Because we rely on linear models, the results should match those that would be generated by the Imai et al. (2011) potential outcomes approach to mediation.

Table A30: Results with dichotomous DV. Effect of treatment on... Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Decreased status (H1)		Prez. Approval (H2)		Less Competent		Increase Challenges		Decreased Capabilities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Status Loss	24.31*** (2.83)	24.49*** (2.82)	−16.17*** (2.86)	−16.76*** (2.85)	11.06*** (2.81)	11.75*** (2.81)	30.90*** (2.64)	31.36*** (2.64)	31.93*** (2.80)	32.13*** (2.79)
Dem. Pres.	6.29** (2.83)	5.86** (2.82)	−1.68 (2.86)	−0.82 (2.85)	−2.72 (2.81)	−2.93 (2.81)	3.70 (2.64)	3.28 (2.63)	2.96 (2.80)	2.68 (2.79)
Income		2.92** (1.37)		−0.53 (1.38)		1.59 (1.36)		0.82 (1.28)		2.52* (1.35)
Age		0.22* (0.12)		0.15 (0.12)		0.02 (0.12)		−0.13 (0.11)		0.15 (0.12)
High school		−24.28 (19.74)		31.81 (19.96)		−24.82 (19.68)		−1.21 (18.47)		−18.41 (19.53)
Some college		−18.61 (19.60)		32.09 (19.81)		−20.84 (19.54)		10.92 (18.33)		−16.24 (19.38)
Associate degree		−21.73 (19.82)		28.27 (20.04)		−21.04 (19.75)		9.85 (18.54)		−11.51 (19.60)
Bachelor’s degree		−17.35 (19.52)		30.42 (19.73)		−22.68 (19.46)		9.78 (18.26)		−12.21 (19.31)
Advanced Degree		−19.02 (19.79)		31.03 (20.01)		−20.57 (19.73)		17.19 (18.51)		−12.30 (19.57)
Ideology		−4.01*** (0.81)		4.40*** (0.82)		−3.73*** (0.80)		−1.70** (0.75)		−3.71*** (0.80)
Constant	41.95*** (2.44)	59.43*** (20.21)	49.00*** (2.46)	−0.91 (20.43)	31.25*** (2.42)	61.12*** (20.15)	49.31*** (2.27)	48.31** (18.91)	29.68*** (2.41)	44.15** (19.99)
Observations	1,144	1,135	1,144	1,135	1,144	1,135	1,144	1,135	1,144	1,135
R ²	0.06	0.10	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.11	0.13	0.10	0.13

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A31: Results with continuous DV. Effect of treatment on... Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Decreased status (H1)		Prez. Approval (H2)		Less Competent		Increase Challenges		Decreased Capabilities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Status Loss	0.69*** (0.08)	0.70*** (0.08)	−0.50*** (0.09)	−0.53*** (0.09)	0.36*** (0.08)	0.39*** (0.08)	0.88*** (0.07)	0.89*** (0.07)	0.79*** (0.08)	0.79*** (0.07)
Dem. Pres.	0.12 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.05 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	−0.14* (0.08)	−0.14* (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	−0.01 (0.08)	−0.001 (0.07)
Income		0.04 (0.04)		−0.03 (0.04)		0.04 (0.04)		−0.01 (0.04)		0.01 (0.04)
Age		0.01** (0.003)		0.004 (0.004)		0.003 (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)		0.01*** (0.003)
High school		−0.85 (0.56)		1.57** (0.65)		−0.41 (0.55)		−0.29 (0.52)		−0.40 (0.52)
Some college		−0.73 (0.55)		1.37** (0.64)		−0.38 (0.55)		−0.03 (0.51)		−0.31 (0.52)
Associate degree		−0.86 (0.56)		1.38** (0.65)		−0.28 (0.56)		0.06 (0.52)		−0.26 (0.53)
Bachelor’s degree		−0.71 (0.55)		1.47** (0.64)		−0.40 (0.55)		0.03 (0.51)		−0.28 (0.52)
Advanced Degree		−0.79 (0.56)		1.52** (0.65)		−0.36 (0.56)		0.18 (0.52)		−0.32 (0.53)
Ideology		−0.12*** (0.02)		0.19*** (0.03)		−0.11*** (0.02)		−0.06*** (0.02)		−0.11*** (0.02)
Constant	4.10*** (0.07)	4.85*** (0.57)	4.21*** (0.08)	2.04*** (0.66)	4.08*** (0.07)	4.61*** (0.57)	4.38*** (0.06)	4.57*** (0.53)	3.90*** (0.07)	4.19*** (0.54)
Observations	1,144	1,135	1,144	1,135	1,144	1,135	1,144	1,135	1,144	1,135
R ²	0.06	0.10	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.13	0.09	0.12

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A32: Mediation analysis with continuous DV and mediators. Estimates from OLS. Reference category for education is “Up to Some High School.”

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Prez. Approval	
	(1)	(2)
Status Loss	−0.01 (0.07)	−0.09 (0.08)
Dem. Pres.	0.04 (0.07)	0.14* (0.08)
Decreased Status	−0.33*** (0.04)	−0.63*** (0.03)
Decreased power	−0.002 (0.04)	
Less competent	−0.55*** (0.03)	
Increase Chal.	−0.09*** (0.03)	
Income	0.01 (0.03)	−0.0001 (0.04)
Age	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)
High school	1.04** (0.47)	1.04* (0.54)
Some college	0.92* (0.47)	0.91* (0.54)
Associate degree	0.95** (0.48)	0.84 (0.55)
Bachelor’s degree	1.02** (0.47)	1.02* (0.54)
Advanced Degree	1.07** (0.48)	1.02* (0.55)
Ideology	0.08*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Constant	6.56*** (0.51)	5.08*** (0.57)
Observations	1,135	1,135
R ²	0.51	0.35
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

D.5 Discussion of open-ended responses

As we explain the paper, we asked respondents several open-ended questions about status and whether it is useful to states as part of the Embedded Natural Experiment. The first question read:

Think for a moment about what it means for a country to be seen as having high status or prestige in the international community. What kinds of things come to mind? Please list these thoughts or considerations below. Simply write down the first thought that comes to mind in the first box, the second in the second box, and so on. Please put only one idea or thought in a box. We've deliberately provided more boxes below than we think most people will need, just so you have plenty of room.

We gave respondents five text boxes in which to record their thoughts. A second question asked, "Some people talk about countries as having high status or prestige in the international community. In your view is being seen as having high status or prestige valuable or useful to a country? What, if anything, can a country with high status or prestige do that a country without high status or prestige could not do?"

We coded responses for the presence of word stems that we view as related to important concepts in the status and prestige literature including positional/relational considerations and concerns related to states attaining success in economics, security, science/technology, human rights, and culture. We presented a table of the most commonly mentioned considerations in the main text and briefly discussed the main conclusions we drew from these results. Space constraints, however, prevented a full discussion of the results of this coding exercise in the paper, but it some readers may be interested a more detailed discussion of the results. First, we noted that most respondents view status as positional. And second, we concluded that the public appreciates the fact that there are multiple dimensions to status and states compete for ranking in a number of different kinds of status hierarchies. The single most commonly referenced dimension was that of the economy, with about 60% of respondents using words relating to the state's economic standing at least once. One respondent, for example, wrote that high status states are those with a "[h]igh rank within a given transnational economic system." The second most commonly referenced dimension was that of security, with 38% of respondents mentioning words relating to the state's risk of harm at least once. Respondents often indicated that high status states have a "large" or "powerful" military, but a number of respondents invoked nuclear weapons specifically or weapons of mass destruction more generally or focused on the ability of high status states to more easily attract allies. In addition to the classic IR focus on hierarchies of economic and military power, our respondents also highlighted the importance of a state's achievements in science, technology, engineering, and medicine or STEM (mentioned by 20% of respondents) and their human rights records (mentioned by 18% of respondents).

We also invited respondents to answer an open-ended question about whether or not status and prestige are valuable to states. Of the respondents who answered the question, about 95% of respondents reported that status was valuable and provided logics for their answer that were by and large. Respondents provided particular logics for their answers which, by and large instrumentally motivated. For example, one respondent explained, "...Prestige means other countries value your opinion and look to you first when dealing with foreign policies..." Others focused on the inferences that other countries draw about high status countries. As one respondent put it: "...If you're respected and have high prestige—other countries will think you're more competent and more

likely to join any efforts you try to put forth. Our analysis thus suggests that the public thinks about status in the way our theories of international status seeking and competition predict: status is positional, multidimensional, and instrumentally useful.

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